

# Information Embedding: From Theory to Practice

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## Outline

- Overview and applications
- Information-theoretic models and analyses
- From theory to practice

# Part I:

# Overview and Applications

## Information Embedding

- **Imperceptibly** embed message into cover data (e.g. images, video, audio, text, computer programs) and **communicate** to receiver
- Private receiver (uses secret key) *vs* Public receiver

Public Receiver	Private Receiver Public Communication	Private Receiver Secret Communication
in-band captioning database annotation	DRM for multimedia authentication content ID transaction tracking networking	steganography timing channels

## Digital Rights Management

- Watermarking is used for copyright protection of Hollywood releases
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- Watermarking is used for copyright protection of Hollywood releases
- In 2004, watermarking made it possible to trace a bootlegged DVD back to a movie screener for the Motion Picture Academy
- Now he has plenty of time to watch DVDs



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# Authentication



Arrest



O. J. Simpson





Forgery?



Authentication of driver licenses

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# Steganography


- The ultimate discreet signaling
- Must conceal existence of hidden message
- Applications: spies, military, revolutionaries, terrorists
- Name comes from ancient Greek,

*στεγανω γραφω : covert writing*


# Ancient Chinese Steganography

陛	下	明	鉴:	微	臣	自	受	命	出	师,	一	刻	未	敢
懈	怠.	今	敌	疲	软	于	西,	又	务	于	东,	此	虽	进
趋	之	时	也,	臣	亦	不	敢	轻	视.	臣	本	耕	读	乡
里,	不	闻	窗	外	之	事.	然	陛	下	不	以	臣	卑	鄙,
寄	臣	以	大	事,	尔	来	二	十	又	一	年	矣.	当	此
存	亡	之	机,	唯	盼	了	敌	于	关	外,	以	不	负	陛
下	重	托.												

# Secret Mask




# Secret Message



# English Translation

Microsoft Windows crashed, again!





## Early Internet Steganography


- **LSB embedding:** a popular image steganography method
- Cover data  $\mathbf{s} = \{s_1, s_2, \dots, s_n\}$
- Each  $s_i \in \{0, 1, \dots, 2^b - 1\}$  ( $b$  bits/sample)

$$77 = (0100110\mathbf{1})$$

- Replace all  $n$  LSB's by hidden binary message  
 $\Rightarrow$  rate  $R = 1$  bit/sample




Lena LSB plane



- Invisible but statistically detectable?

Part II:  
Information-Theoretic  
Models and Analyses


# A Generic Problem: Hiding Data in Images



## Basic Properties

- **Fidelity** (in terms of signal distortion metric)  
↔ discretion level
- **Payload** (number of transmitted bits)
- **Robustness/Security** (against adversary)
- **Detectability** (by steganalyzers/eavesdroppers)

## Basic Communication Model



- Encoding function  $\mathbf{x} = f(\mathbf{s}, m, \mathbf{k})$
- **Attack channel**  $p(\mathbf{y}|\mathbf{x})$  (stochastic)
- **Distortion** constraints on  $f$  and  $p(\mathbf{y}|\mathbf{x})$
- Decoding function  $\hat{m} = g(\mathbf{y}, \mathbf{k})$

## System Issues

(only partially covered by basic communication model)


- Does receiver know host signal? ( $\mathbf{k}$  correlated with  $\mathbf{s}$ )  
(*blind vs nonblind* decoding)
- Communication protocol
- Security level
- Private or public cryptographic system?

## Attack Models

- No attack
- “Signal processing” attacks
- Cryptanalysis
- System-level attacks  
(e.g., mosaicing, ambiguity, chosen-plaintext)



## The 1990's: Spread-Spectrum Codes




- OK if host  $\mathbf{S}$  is known to receiver
- Weak performance otherwise ( $\mathbf{S}$  is treated as noise)

## The 21st Century: Binning Codes

- Fundamental information-theoretic technique  
(Slepian-Wolf 1975; Gel'fand-Pinsker 1980; Costa 1983)
- Host  $\mathbf{S}$  is a **known interference** to encoder
- Can't cancel  $\mathbf{S}$  due to fidelity constraints
- But can “optimally adapt” to  $\mathbf{S}$
- Natural framework for blind data hiding


## Binning $\leftrightarrow$ pdf shaping

- Embed 1 bit in signal feature  $s$
- Decoder performs statistical test:  $Y \sim p_0$  vs  $Y \sim p_1$
- Can shape  $p_0$  and  $p_1$  to concentrate information and maximize reliability of test




- Can shape  $p_0$  and  $p_1$  using quantization scheme

- Quantization embedding




$m = 0$



$m = 1$

# Information-Theoretic Limits



- Probability of error  $P_{e,N} = Pr[\hat{M} \neq M]$
- Probability mass function  $p_S(s)$  (i.i.d. symbols)
- Additive distortion function  $d^N(\mathbf{S}, \mathbf{X}) = \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^N d(S_i, X_i)$
- Constraint on encoder:  $d^N(\mathbf{S}, \mathbf{X}) \leq D_1$
- Constraint on attacker :  $d^N(\mathbf{X}, \mathbf{Y}) \leq D_2$


## Capacity and Reliability Function

- **Goal:** make  $P_{e,N} \rightarrow 0$  as  $N \rightarrow \infty$
- Coding problem with side information (Gel'fand-Pinsker type)
- What is the maximum rate  $C$  such that this is possible?

$$C = \max_{Q(x,u|s,k)} \min_{A(y|x)} [I(U; Y, K) - I(U; S, K)]$$


- Mathematical expressions for capacity can be derived and evaluated numerically
- The capacity limit is achievable by random binning

# Gaussian Case




- Host  $S$  is i.i.d. Gaussian, MSE distortion constraints  $D_1, D_2$
- $\sigma_S^2 \gg D_1$  (large interference)  $\Rightarrow C \sim \frac{1}{2} \log \left( 1 + \frac{D_1}{D_2} \right)$
- Perfect interference cancellation!

- $C$ -achieving distributions are Gaussian:




# Lattice VQ Based Binning Codes

- Decompose lattice  $\Lambda$  into cosets  $\Lambda_1, \Lambda_2, \dots, \Lambda_M$



**Encoder**



**Decoder**

- Capacity-achieving family!
- Outperforms Spread Spectrum codes




Part III:  
From Theory to Practice

## Hiding Data in Images



Lena




Block-DCT coefficients


- Parallel-Gaussian model for host
- Weighted MSE metric
- $D_2 = 5D_1 \Rightarrow C \approx 0.01$  bpp

# Practical IT-Based Codes

(Solanki et al. 2004)



Active Blocks



Selected DCT coefficients

- Order selected DCT coefficients into a sequence
- Interleave information bits, concatenate Reed-Solomon code with quantization code

- Embed 14,336 bits ( $R = 0.055$  bpp)
- Withstands erasures and deletions



- Error-free recovery of the information bits

## Simple Geometric Attacks



Shifted Lena




Lena



Rotated Lena

- General model: parametric class  $\{T_\theta, \theta \in \Theta\}$  of attacks



- No loss in capacity relative to coherent case

## Complex Geometric Attacks



Lena



Warped Lena

- The “noncoherent penalty” can be severe when  $\theta$  is time-varying, e.g., warping or random bending
- There exist good binning codes, but constructing practical ones is difficult!

## Steganography

- Data hiding with undetectability requirement
- Assume steganalyzer knows  $f$  and statistics of  $\mathbf{S}$  and tests

$$\left\{ \begin{array}{ll} \text{hypothesis } H_0 & : \mathbf{X} \sim p_{\mathbf{S}} \quad \text{no hidden data} \\ \text{hypothesis } H_1 & : \mathbf{X} \sim p_{\mathbf{x}} \quad \text{hidden data} \end{array} \right.$$

- *Perfect Secrecy* condition:  $p_{\mathbf{x}} = p_{\mathbf{S}}$
- Randomized codes

## Conclusion

- Specify communication model, including distortion and robustness levels
- Information Theory
  - provides fundamental performance bounds
  - guides the development of good practical schemes

For more details, see Moulin and Koetter, “Data-Hiding Codes,”  
*Proceedings of the IEEE*, December 2005.