

Problem set: VI's Introduction

March 10, 2010

Exercise 1 (Normal Cone)

(a) Let $K \subset \mathbb{R}^n$ be a convex set and let $\bar{x} \in K$ be a given point. Show that the normal cone $\mathcal{N}_K(\bar{x})$ is closed convex cone.

(b) Let K_1 and K_2 be convex subsets in \mathbb{R}^n . Show the following relation

$$\mathcal{N}_{K_1}(x) + \mathcal{N}_{K_2}(x) \subset \mathcal{N}_{K_1 \cap K_2}(x) \quad \text{for all } x \in K_1 \cap K_2.$$

(c) Show that the relation in (b) holds with equality if the sets K_1 and K_2 are such that $\text{int}(K_1) \cap \text{int}(K_2) \neq \emptyset$, where $\text{int}(K)$ stands for the interior of a set K .

Exercise 2 Let $X \subset \mathbb{R}^n$ be a closed convex set. Let $f : \mathbb{R}^n \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ and $g_i : \mathbb{R}^n \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$, $i = 1, \dots, m$ be convex and continuously differentiable functions. Consider the following optimization problem

$$\begin{aligned} & \text{minimize} && f(x) \\ & \text{subject to} && g_i(x) \leq 0 \text{ for all } i = 1, \dots, m, \\ & && x \in X. \end{aligned} \tag{1}$$

Assume that the optimal value of the problem is finite. Also, assume that the Slater condition holds, i.e., there is $\bar{x} \in X$ such that $g_i(\bar{x}) < 0$ for all i . Show that x^* is a solution to the preceding minimization problem if and only if a pair (x^*, μ^*) solves $VI(K, F)$ where $K = X \times \mathbb{R}_+^m$ and

$$F(x, \mu) = \begin{bmatrix} \nabla f(x) + \sum_{i=1}^m \mu_i \nabla g_i(x) \\ -g_1(x) \\ \vdots \\ -g_m(x) \end{bmatrix}.$$

Exercise 3 (*Generalized Nash game*) Consider a game of N players. Each player i has a convex and continuously differentiable cost function $f_i(x_i, x_{-i})$. A player i wants to minimize his cost with respect to his decision variable x_i over a closed convex decision set $K_i(x_i, x_{-i}) = \{x_i \mid g_i(x_i, x_{-i}) \leq 0\}$ where g_i is a convex and continuously differentiable function. Note that the players' decision sets are coupled!

Assume that the Slater condition holds for the decision sets, i.e., there is \bar{x} such that $g_i(\bar{x}) < 0$ for $i = 1, \dots, N$. Formulate the generalized Nash equilibrium problem as a Mixed Complementarity problem.

Exercise 4 Let $K \subseteq \mathbb{R}^n$ be a convex and closed set, and let $F : K \rightarrow \mathbb{R}^n$ be a continuous mapping. Show that x^* is a solution to $VI(K, F)$ if and only if

$$F_{K,A}^{\text{nat}}(x^*) = 0,$$

where

$$F_{K,A}^{\text{nat}}(x) \triangleq x - \Pi_{K,A}[x - A^{-1}F(x)],$$

with A being a symmetric and positive definite $n \times n$ matrix. (See page 85 of the volume I of the book by Facchinei and Pang).